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Abstract 
Some people assign negative values for new products sold on laboratory auction blocks 
(i.e., irradiated meat).   We explore bidding behavior in two Vickrey auctions when 
people have positive and negative induced values for the good.   Aggregate bidding in the 
second-price auction is precise but biased—highest-value positive bidders tend to 
overstate benefits, whereas lowest-negative bidders understate losses.  In contrast, 
bidding behavior in the random nth-price auction is demand revealing irrespective of 
induced value, but it is imprecise.  Examining on- and off-margin bidding behavior, we 
cannot conclude that any segments of demand are significantly different than the demand 
revealing regression line.  
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Researchers use experimental auctions now to help them better understand the potential 
demand for new or different goods and services (e.g., Fox et al., 1998; Lusk et al.; 
Shogren).   But some people who participate in these laboratory valuation exercises have 
negative opinions, and therefore negative values, about many new food products being 
auctioned, like irradiated meat or genetically modified potatoes.  The open question we 
address herein is whether the presence of negative values affects bidding behavior within 
the incentive compatible Vickrey-style auctions used in laboratory valuation experiments.   
Rather than having people bid on new products, we use a classic induced value design 
that controls preferences to create a testable behavioral benchmark (Smith).   Our auction 
environment has people bidding over a good in which both positive and negative induced 
values exist within the population of bidders.    
We examine the potential bias and precision of bidding behavior for two popular 
auctions used in laboratory valuation work—the classic Vickrey second-price auction and 
the random nth-price auction, a mechanism initially designed to engage people with 
values otherwise below the market-clearing price in the second-price auction (see 
Shogren et al., 2001).   The next section sets the stage for our experiments by discussing 
the broader context behind negative values and bidding behavior.  We then present the 
details for the experimental design. The next two sections discuss the results, and on- and 
off-the-margin bidder behavior.   We offer concluding remarks in the final section. 
 
Background 
Our experiments were motivated by a broader context on how negative values can affect 
valuation.  Neoteric food products like irradiated pork, growth hormone milk, genetically 
modified potatoes have conjured up diametrically opposed images for consumers in the 
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marketplace.   Irradiation to some people means reduced risk from food borne pathogens, 
but implies “nuclear meat” to others; growth hormones implies more production at lower 
cost and worries of “cow junkies”; genetic modification means enough cheap food to 
feed the planet and yet still generates concerns of “frankenfood.”1  Many consumers react 
positively on net to these ambiguous products, and will pay for them, while others react 
negatively and would have to be paid to eat them (see, e.g., Buhr et al.).  Although 
supermarkets sell these products on a limited basis (e.g., irradiation) or without explicit 
labels (e.g., genetic modification), little is still known about the general consumer 
demand because it remains an open question as to how they will react to these new food 
technologies.2  
As a way to learn more about potential consumer choice, researchers have 
designed a series of laboratory experiments that ask people to reveal their preferences in a 
real auction in which they spent money and consumed the actual controversial food 
products.3  Experimental methods are designed to isolate and control the market setting to 
address specific questions on how people value new and controversial food products. 
These experiments typically used Vickrey’s second-price auction to reveal demand. The 
attraction of the second-price auction is that, in theory, it is demand revealing.  A bidder’s 
weakly dominant strategy is to bid his true preferences for the auction good, irrespective 
of whether his value is on-net positive or negative.  A person who bids less than his true 
value risks foregoing a profitable purchase, whereas someone who overbids risks making 
negative profits by paying too much for the good.    
Researchers recognized that some people who agreed to participate in these 
auctions might actually have a negative value for the product on the auction block.4  They 
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might demand that they be paid to eat the product.  But rather than allowing for negative 
bids in the second-price auction, experiments were designed on the presumption that 
people with negative values would pay nothing and therefore would submit a zero bid 
(see Fox, Hayes, and Shogren).5  Other researchers, however, made a pragmatic choice 
on a design that first screened and then separated subjects into two groups—those who 
preferred the new product to the standard product (positive values for new), and those 
who preferred the typical to the new (negative values for new).6  Buhr et al. for example, 
avoided any questions about negative value bidding behavior for growth hormone pork 
by separating people by whether they said they preferred normal or growth hormone 
pork.  They then segregated the bidders into two auctions such that each person was 
bidding for the good they said they preferred.7  All bids were either positive or zero.    
The question of negative values also has potential implications for current 
discussion over the valuation of nonmarket public goods.   While the method of 
contingent valuation studies has stirred much debate (e.g., Hanemann; Diamond and 
Hausman), researchers now realize that environmental externalities may be perceived as 
either costs or benefits depending on the individual (Clinch and Murphy).8  The 
truncation of respondents’ negative valuations in contingent valuation studies would both 
bias results, and it would also imply flawed policy choices based on such results 
(Macmillan, Duff, and Elston).  While the experiments in this article study private goods, 
they are timely as an initial controlled exploration into whether allowing positive, zero, 
and negative bids—in commonly used experimental auction institutions—is successful in 
promoting accurate demand revelation for all preference possibilities for a product.      
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The decision to either truncate bidding at zero or to screen-and-separate prior to 
bidding was motivated by the fact that no experimental evidence exists on how people 
actually bid in the second-price auction when they have both positive and negative 
values.9   It is not obvious that people will bid consistently over positive and negative 
values, with either private or induced values.  A substantial literature now exists which 
suggests people fear a loss more than they desire the equivalent gain (see Camerer).   The 
behavioral observations of loss aversion, alarmist reactions, and the willingness to pay 
(WTP)-willingness to accept (WTA) gap are manifestations of this asymmetric 
behavioral reaction to gains and losses   Loss aversion type behavior implies that 
monetary losses associated with switching to an alternative are given greater weight than 
corresponding gains (see Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, 2000).  Alarmist reactions exist 
when people provided with both positive and negative descriptions about a product act as 
if they were only given the negative description (see Viscusi).10   
These findings raise some concern about bidding behavior in laboratory valuation 
auctions in which negative values could exist.  For instance, in a second-price auction, if 
people with negative values overreact by bidding more negatively to avoid controversial 
food like irradiated meat, the laboratory results would inflate the potential negative 
reaction in a market.   We address this issue by going back to fundamentals—we design 
an induced-value experiment to explore how negative values affects bidding behavior 
within two Vickrey style auctions.  The induced value setting provides the cleanest 
environment to test how negative values can affect bidding behavior because it stays 
away from the unknown private preferences that arise with actual goods and services.   If 
the auctions fail to induce people to bid rationally here, people should wonder if the 
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mechanism have or might fail in non-induced valuation experiments in which we do not 
know a person’s actual value.  Consider now the details of our experimental design. 
 
Experimental Design  
We consider bidding behavior within two Vickrey-style auctions—a classic second-price 
auction and a random nth-price auction (the cut-off bidder is selected at random, i.e., the 
nth-price rather than the second-price; see Shogren et al., 2001).   We use the random 
nth-price auction to engage bidders whose values fall below the margin of the market-
clearing second price.  Evidence suggests bidders have less incentive to bid sincerely 
when they have little chance of winning an auction (see Franciosi et al.).    
Our general experimental design follows standard procedures, except we use three 
sets of positive and negative induced values as the treatments and subjects were assigned 
a new induced value in each round (also see Kagel).11  Each round had nine steps.  Step 1: 
each bidder received a value sheet that had his or her private resale value for that round.  
The bidder’s resale value is the price the monitor would pay to the bidder if he were the 
highest bidder.  The sets of private values were randomly drawn from a uniform 
distribution of [$-5.00, $5.00] in ten-cent increments.  We created three sets of private 
resale values as the treatments: (A) [-4.7, -3.9, -2.8, -1.5, -1.0, 0.2, 1.3, 2.6, 2.9, 3.9]; (B) 
[-4.8, -4.4, -1.3, 0.8, 1.3, 1.4, 2.9, 3.1, 3.2, 4.4]; and (C) [0.3, 1.1, 2.2, 3.5, 4.0, 5.2, 6.3, 
7.6, 7.9, 8.9].   We created treatment C, the all-positive value baseline, by adding $5 to 
each value in treatment A.  Each treatment had twenty rounds of bidding such that each 
bidder had each value twice.  Each bidder had a personal and private record sheet to 
maintain that created a history of past induced values, bids, and profits, and the market-
clearing price for previous rounds. 
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Step 2: the rules of the auction mechanism were introduced to the bidders.  For 
the second-price auction, subjects were told that the subject with the highest bid would 
buy one unit of the good and would pay a market price that was equal to the second 
highest bid.  The subjects were not informed of the dominant strategy of the second-price 
auction.  Each bidder then submitted a private and sealed bid to buy one unit of the good. 
Step 3: the monitor ranked the bids from highest to lowest.  Step 4: the second highest bid 
set the market-clearing price.  Step 5: the monitor posted the market-clearing price as 
public information.  Step 6: the highest bidder purchased one unit of the good at the 
market price.  Step 7: the highest bidder then sold the unit back to the monitor at his or 
her assigned resale value for that auction.  The bidder’s profits equaled the difference 
between his or her resale value and the market-clearing price for that round: profits = 
resale value – market price.  Subjects were informed that they could have negative 
profits.  Step 8: all bidders at or below the market-clearing price did not purchase the 
good and recorded zero profits.  Step 9: the round ended and they returned to Step 1.   
For the random nth-price auction, the steps were identical except for the 
allocation rule.  After each player submits a bid and each bid is rank-ordered from highest 
to lowest, now the monitor selects a random number uniformly distributed between 2 and 
k bidders.  The monitor sells one unit of the good to each of the (n-1) highest bidders at 
the nth-price.   If the monitor, for example, randomly selected n = 6, the five highest 
bidders each purchase one unit priced at the sixth-highest bid.  Now bidders with low or 
negative valuation have a nontrivial chance to buy or accept the good since the price is 
determined randomly.  The auction increases the odds that bidding less sincerely leads to 
negative profits.  Each bidder, on- or off-margin, has incentive to bid his private value.  
 7
For the second-price auction, treatments (A), (B), and (C) had three, two, and two 
sessions, with ten subjects each. For the random nth-price auction, treatments (D), (E), 
and (F) each had two sessions, ten subjects in each session.  Subjects were recruited 
following standard procedures from undergraduate economic courses.   
 
Results and discussion 
We now present the results for both auctions.  Tables 1 and 2 summarize the central 
tendencies and variances of observed bidding behavior by induced value and treatment 
for the second-price and random nth-price auctions.12  We examine three hypotheses to 
test aggregate and individual bidding behavior.13, 14   Consider each in turn, starting with 
the general question of sincere bidding behavior.    
      H1:  In the pooled sample across the three relevant treatments, subjects bid sincerely 
in auction k (k = second-price auction, random nth-price auction). 
 
If all subjects were rational bidders, each bid should equal the induced value, and we 
would not reject H1.  We test H1 by nesting it within the general structure  
(1)    Bidit =  + INit + ui +t + it       
where Bidit denotes subject i’s bid in trial t; INit denotes subject i’s induced value in trial 
t; ui represents subject-specific characteristics; t represents trial-specific effects, 
including learning or other trends in bidding behavior; and it is iid error.  In equation (1), 
data points along a 45 ray from the origin in Bid-IN space (=1; =0; ui =t =0 t,i) are 
perfectly demand revealing bids.  
For the second-price auction, under the maintained hypothesis that the ui and the 
t  are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution (two-way random effects) the estimated 
equation is15    
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Bidit =   0.13 +   0.98INit , 
  (0.29)        (0.03) 
The standard errors of the estimates are in parentheses.  The regression line is flatter than 
the perfect-revelation line, with positive intercept and slope below one.  Using a Wald 
test statistic to test the joint hypothesis that  = 1, and   = 0, however, we cannot reject 
H1: in aggregate, subjects tended to bid sincerely given both positive and negative values 
(W= 3.48; p-value = 0.18).      
For the random nth-price auction, the estimated equation is   
Bidit =  - 0.18 +   1.05INit  , 
    (0.52)       (0.05) 
The standard errors are in parentheses. The regression line is steeper than the perfect-
revelation line, with negative intercept and slope greater than one.  Using a Wald test 
statistic to test the joint hypothesis that  = 1, and   = 0, however, we cannot reject H1: 
in aggregate, subjects tended to bid sincerely given both positive and negative values 
(W= 0.95; p-value = 0.62).16      
 Our second hypothesis (H2) addresses the issue of whether bidding behavior 
differs across treatments.   
H2:   Subjects’ bidding behavior with mixed negative and positive induced values 
does not differ relative to when bidders only have positive induced values in 
auction k (k = second-price auction, random nth-price auction).   
 
Theory says that a bidder in a second-price auction in which negative and positive values 
exist should use the same bidding strategy as if he was in the auction with only positive 
value bidders.  His dominant strategy is to bid his induced value in either case.  The 
testable hypothesis is that bidding behavior is the same for the two positive-negative 
treatments (A&B; D&E) relative to the all-positive treatment (C; F).   
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If bidders use the dominant strategy, each bid should again equal the induced 
value.  To test the hypothesis that bidding behavior is constant across treatments, we 
estimate the following equation:        
(2)  Bidit =  + INit + 1Dit + 2 Dit*INit + ui +t + it           
where Bidit, INit, ui, it, and t are the same as in equation (1). Dit is a dummy variable that 
equals one for observations from the positive-negative treatments and zero otherwise, and 
Dit*INit is an interactive variable that equals the subject’s induced value in the positive-
negative treatment, zero otherwise. The coefficient on Dit shifts the intercept term, while 
the coefficient on Dit*INit changes the slope for the positive-negative treatments.  In 
equation (2), if 1 = 2 = 0, no difference exists in bidding behavior between the positive-
negative treatments and the all-positive treatment.  
 For the second-price auction, based on two-way random effects, the estimated 
equation is   
Bidit = - 0.19 +   1.02INit +  0.40Dit - 0.06Dit*INit 
  (0.36)       (0.07)            (0.38)       (0.08)   
Standard errors are in parentheses. We see the regression line is slightly flatter and the 
intercept larger for the positive-negative treatments than for the all-positive treatment.  
Again using a Wald test statistic to test the joint hypothesis that 1 = 2 = 0, we cannot 
reject the joint hypothesis (H2) that the mean of 1 = 2 = 0 (W=1.15; p-value = 0.56).  
Bidding behavior was not statistically different in the positive-negative treatments than in 
the all-positive treatment. 
 For the random nth-price auction, again based on two-way random effects, and 
estimating equation (2), the estimated equation is   
Bidit = - 0.02 + 1.00INit + 0.02Dit + 0.09Dit*INit      
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              (0.65)       (0.12)            (0.69)       (0.14)   
Standard errors are in parenthesis.  We see the regression line is slightly steeper and the 
intercept slightly larger for the positive-negative treatments than for the all-positive 
treatment.  For the all-positive treatment the estimated regression line is near perfect.  
Again using a Wald test statistic to test the joint hypothesis that 1 = 2 = 0, we cannot 
reject the joint hypothesis (H2) that the mean of 1 = 2 = 0 (W = 0.79; p-value = 0.67).  
Bidding behavior was not statistically different in the positive-negative treatments than in 
the all-positive treatment.17 
Finally, we consider whether an individual bidder bids differently when confronted 
with a negative value compared to a positive value.  We focus here on bidding behavior 
in treatments A&B and D&E.   
H3:   In auction k (k = second-price auction, random nth-price auction), subjects’ 
bidding behavior in the positive-negative treatments (A&B or D&E) does not differ 
when their induced value is negative relative to when it is positive.   
 
Again, theory predicts that a bidder’s behavior should both equal his induced value and 
be invariant to the distribution of the values.   We test the hypothesis by estimating the 
following equation: 
(3)  Bidit = i + INit + 1 NEGit + 2 (NEGit*INit) + ui +t + it                      
where Bidit, INit, ui, it, and t are the same as in equation (1) and (2).  NEGit is a dummy 
variable, which equals one when bidder i has a negative value in round t, and equals zero 
otherwise.  NEGit allows the intercept term to adjust for bids on negative values.  
NEGit*INit is an interaction term that allows the slope of the regression line to vary 
between positive and negative values.  We test bidder behavior as follows: In equation 
(3), if 1 = 2 = 0, a bidder’s behavior does not differ across positive and negative values.  
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For the second-price auction, assuming two-way random effects, the estimated 
equation is   
Bidit =   - 0.25 + 1.14INit - 0.08 NEGit - 0.31 (NEGit*INit) 
        (0.41)       (0.10)           (0.41)               (0.14)   
Standard errors are in parentheses. We observe the intercept term for the positive values 
is slightly larger than is the intercept term for negative values, - 0.25 versus - 0.33.  The 
slope of the regression line, however, is steeper for positive values relative to negative 
values,  = 1.14 versus ( + 2) = 0.83.   Using a Wald test statistic to test the joint 
hypothesis that 1 = 2 = 0, we still cannot reject the joint hypothesis (H3) (W= 2.78; p-
value = 0.25).   Overall, bidding behavior was not statistically different within treatment 
using standard levels of confidence when subjects had negative and positive induced 
values.18   
For the random nth-price auction, the estimated equation is   
Bidit = 0.16 + 1.05INit - 1.13 NEGit - 0.24 (NEGit*INit). 
        (0.18)      (0.23)         (1.03)               (0.34)   
Standard errors are in parentheses. We observe that the intercept term for the positive 
values is much larger than is the intercept term for negative values, 0.16 versus - 0.97.  
The regression line is steeper for positive values relative to negative values,  = 1.05 
versus ( + 2) = 0.81.   Using a Wald test statistic to test the joint hypothesis that 1 = 2 
= 0, we still cannot reject the joint hypothesis (H3) (W= 1.50; p-value = 0.47).   Overall, 
bidding behavior was not statistically different within treatment when subjects had 
negative and positive induced values.  Moreover, neither estimated coefficient for NEGit 
or (NEGit*INit) are statistically significant providing stronger evidence subjects bidding 
behavior was not different for positive values relative to negative values.19,20 
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We now discuss the implication of these results.  One explanation for why no 
significant difference was found with the joint test for the second-price auction is due to 
the large variance on the intercept term for the negative treatment.   If we step back from 
the joint hypothesis and evaluate each coefficient estimate separately we find the 
intercept term is not significantly different from zero, but the slope term, NEGit*INit, is 
different than zero at the 1.5 percent significance level.   We see that the average bidder 
with large positive values overstate their gains, and the average bidder with large 
negative values overstate their losses.  Subjects overbid the positive values by about 14 
percent; subjects overbid the negative values by roughly 17 percent (1.14 - 0.31 = 0.83).    
If overbidding pattern transferred to laboratory valuation auctions for controversial 
products like irradiated meat, the results could cause someone to overrate the extent of 
public support and to underrate the magnitude of public opposition.     
One explanation why negative-value bidders might have overstated their losses in 
the second-price auction is the disengaged bidder (Shogren et al., 2001).  The second-
price auction can fail to engage bidders who fall off the margin of the market-clearing 
second price.  Table 1 shows for most of our negative values, median bids were closer to 
the negative induced values than the mean bids, which indicate that the average bids were 
pulled closer to zero by a few negative value bidders who submitted relative large 
positive bids.   If the disengaged bidder thesis explains observed behavior in these 
treatments, our bidders did not bid randomly above and below the negative induced 
value, as one could expect; nor did they bid more negatively as if they feared the 
potential loss.  Instead, the average bidder systematically underreported negative values 
because a few bidders seem to want to be closer to the market-clearing price. Negative 
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values themselves do not explain why some low value bidders bid too high; it happens 
when induced values are all positive as well.   The potential risk of any second-price 
auction is that the off-margin bidders become disengaged, which in our case translated 
into bidding less negatively than predicted by either rational choice theory or behavioral 
models of loss aversion.   
 At first glance, one might conclude the random nth-price auction did better at 
engaging on-margin and off-margin bidders than the second-price auction.  In aggregate 
subjects in the random nth-price auction bid more sincerely—no difference existed 
between bidding in the all-positive and the positive-negative treatments.  In contrast to 
the second-price auction, no difference emerged in bidding behavior for positive values 
relative to negative values.   A deeper look into the data and the regression results, 
however, raises reservations about accepting this conclusion.   First, comparing the 
descriptive statistics for both auction types (tables 1 and 2) shows the distribution of bids 
around the associated induced value was tighter for the second-price than the random nth-
price auction.   Table 1 shows the average variance for the second-price auction is 15.07, 
ranging from 46.33 to 1.48.   Bid variances were about three times higher for the random 
nth-price auction—the average variance was 41.57, ranging from 156.52 to 1.48.     
 Second, the estimated coefficients’ standard errors are smaller for the second-
price auction compared to the same coefficients for the random nth-price auction.  
Smaller standard errors lead to tighter confidence intervals and more precise tests.21   
Third, table 3 shows that we omitted 3 percent of the observations (39 of 1200) from the 
random nth-price auction, and less than 1 percent (10 of 1400) from the second-price 
auction.   More subjects bid erratically more frequently in the random nth-price auction.  
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These three points suggests we should combine data across auctions to explore how the 
two auctions compare in engaging on- and off-margin bidders.  We turn to this next. 
 
On-margin and Off-margin bidding 
 
Similar to Shogren et al. (2001), we examine the effectiveness of the random nth-price 
auction relative to the second-price auction to engage both on- and off-margin bidders.   
We separate the induced values into four separate groups: off-margin low values [$-5.00, 
$-2.50]; off-margin mid values [$-2.49, $0.00]; off-margin high values [$0.01, $2.50]; 
and on margin values [$2.51, $5.00].  We segment the induced values into four equal 
groups to compare the subjects’ bidding behavior for small subsamples of values against 
the entire range of induced values, within and across auction types.  Table 4 shows for all 
four groups the second-price auction had both (a) smaller average and absolute deviation 
from the induced value, and (b) a tighter variance, which suggests the second-price 
auction engaged on and off-margin bidders more effectively. 
We consider whether this result holds using conditional panel data.  Extending the 
model from equation (1), we estimate the following equation to disentangle the treatment 
effects on sincere bidding: 
Bidit =  + 1INit + 2(On*Nthit) + 3(On*INit*Nthit) + 4(highit)  
              + 5(highit*INit) + 6(highit*Nthit) + 7(highit*INit*Nthit) 
(4)                  + 8(midit) + 9(midit*INit) + 10(midit*Nthit)                        
              + 11(midit*INit*Nthit) + 12(lowit) + 13(lowit*INit)      
  + 14(lowit*Nthit) + 15(lowit*INit*Nthit)  + ui + it,  
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where the dependent variable, Bidit, is subject i’s bid in trial t, ui is a subject specific 
random effect that accounts for systematic differences in bidding patterns and controls for 
ordering of the experiment types; INit is subject i’s induced private value in trial t; Nthit = 
1 if the subject participated in the random nth price auction, 0 otherwise; and Onit  = 1 for 
bidder i in trial t if his value was in the range [$5.00, $2.51] in trial t, 0 otherwise; and 
highit  = 1 for bidder i in trial t if his value was in the range [$2.50, $0.01] in trial t, 0 
otherwise; and midit  = 1 for bidder i in trial t if his value was in the range [$0.00, $-2.49] 
in trial t, 0 otherwise; and lowit  = 1 for bidder i in trial t if his value was in the range [$-
2.50, $-5.00] in trial t, 0 otherwise.   The remaining variables INit*Nthit, ONit*Nthit, 
Onit*INit*Nthit, highit*INit, highit*Nthit, highit*INit*Nthit, midit*INit, midit*Nthit, 
midit*INit*Nthit, lowit*INit, lowit*Nthit, and lowit*INit*Nthit, are interaction terms and allow 
slope and intercept changes across auction and bidder type (off/on-the-margin bidders).   
 Table 5 presents the regression results for both the sample with and without 
outliers.  Our discussion focuses on the results with outliers omitted.  First consider the 
slope coefficients.  All variables with IN as a component affect the slope of the regression 
line.  Of these slope variables, one is significantly different than zero—the base slope 
coefficient for the second-price auction, IN.  Slope changes in the second-price and 
random nth-price auction regression lines are perturbations from this base level.   All 
slope coefficients that have Nth*IN relate to the random nth-price auction regression line, 
while slope coefficients with IN and no Nth correspond to the second-price auction.  All 
other slope coefficients are not significantly different from zero, and adjustments in the 
slopes are not significantly different from the base slope. This says the slopes of the 
regression lines are statistically equivalent for the two auctions.   
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Examining the intercept terms, all variables that exclude IN, indicates the 
intercepts of the regression lines for both auctions are not statistically different from zero.  
All estimated coefficients on the intercept terms are insignificant.  These results support 
the hypothesis that no statistical difference exists between the two auctions. Both 
auctions seemed to perform equally well at engaging on- and off-margin bidders. 
 Based on the estimated coefficients, table 6 presents the Wald test statistics for the 
joint hypothesis of zero intercept and slope equal to unity for both on- and off-margin 
bidders in each auction.  We cannot reject the joint hypothesis for off-margin bidders and 
on-margin bidders in both auctions.  This result might have occurred because the standard 
errors in the random nth-price auction are roughly two to three times larger than in the 
second-price auction (see table 4).  We also examine the p-values on the Wald statistics 
and see greater odds of rejecting the null for the random nth-price auction relative to the 
second-price auction for all groupings except low (On: 17 to 59 percent, high: 87 to 100 
percent, and mid: 54 to 72 percent).   Accompanied with the difference in outliers (22 in 
treatments D & E; 8 in treatments A & B), these results suggest further analysis into the 
differences in the two auction mechanisms is worth exploring.22 
Turning to table 3, we see that 7 of 22 omitted observations were in the low 
category and 6 of the 7 have relatively large negative bids.  One bid, -10,000 on a -2.80 
induced value, is most likely the driving force behind these results.  More subjects in the 
random nth-price auctions seemed to employ a strategy of bidding extremely low (or 
large negatives) in rounds in which they had low induced values.  One can speculate that 
these subjects were hoping a high n would be drawn such that the market-clearing price 
would be an extremely low value creating windfall profits for all the other bidders, e.g., 
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all winning bidders get paid, say $1000.  These strategic bidders could have affected 
other subjects’ bidding behavior by signaling this windfall-bidding through a negative 
market price such that everyone had a chance to earn windfall profits.  Researchers 
should take caution with the random nth-price auction so exorbitant payoffs are not 
generated by subjects attempting to game the auction institution.  Truncating payoffs 
would solve this problem but would introduce the complication of not carrying out the 
payoff procedures described to the subjects. 
 
Conclusion 
Some people who volunteer for laboratory valuation auctions, or a stated preference 
survey for that matter, can hold negative values for the new product or service being sold 
on the block (i.e., irradiated meat, GM foods, a ban on snowmobiles in Yellowstone).   
This article tests whether two alternative Vickrey-style auctions elicited truthful bids 
across the positive-negative valuation divide, which characterizes consumer reaction to 
many new products.   Our results show that neither the second-price nor the random nth-
price auction performed without fault in an induced-value experiment.   Aggregate 
bidding in the second-price auction was precise but biased—highest-positive-value 
bidders tended to overstate their benefits, whereas lowest-negative-value bidders tended 
to understate their costs.  In contrast, aggregate bidding in the random nth-price auction 
was demand revealing across all induced values, but it was imprecise—the variance was 
relatively large and some bidders submitted very negative bids, seemingly strategically.    
We are not surprised that the auctions performed less than perfectly—we did not 
tell subjects about the optimal bidding strategy (e.g., “bid your induced value”), which 
puts the cognitive burden on them.  Evidence reveals hit-and-miss bidding behavior in 
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all-positive-induced-values auctions too (see Kagel).  What we find surprising is how the 
average negative-value bidder tended to understate losses in the second-price auction, 
irrespective of positive or negative induced value, and to overstate losses in the random 
nth-price auction.  What if these results transfer to non-induced laboratory auctions?  For 
Dickinson and Bailey’s second-price auction on meat characteristics, our findings suggest 
their results are an upper bound on consumers’ actual valuation of the auction items (as 
they noted).  Though negative bids were relatively rare, actual consumer negative 
reaction to some types of information they examined would be understated, based on our 
findings.  Caution would be prudent in assessing the magnitude of such laboratory 
auction bids, though results of such studies can signal the potential retail market share for 
new products, at least for the case of premium prices (see Shogren et al., 1999).  In 
contrast, had Dickinson and Bailey used a random nth-price auction, their results might 
have been more demand revealing but more noisy, making it difficult to attach any 
statistical significance to important changes in bids across individuals auctioned items—a 
key objective of their study.    
We see that the auction mechanism mattered: the second-price auction was 
precise but biased; the random nth-price auction was unbiased but imprecise.  The choice 
of auction can attenuate or exaggerate subjects’ negative reactions to a new good.  An 
outside observer using such laboratory data should note the risk of underestimating the 
negative reaction to new goods in the marketplace (e.g., consumer picketing or boycotts).   
More research exploring the robustness of our findings to alternative auctions, real 
commodities, and assessing their external validity in retail markets seems worthwhile.  
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Footnotes 
 
1.  See Bruhn, Caswell and Padberg, Food and Water, Inc., Fox et al. (1995, 2002), 
Gates, and Greenpeace International.   
2.  See Aquino and Falk’s survey and retail study on “wolf-friendly” beef in New 
Mexico. 
3.  See for example Alfnes and Rickertsen; Buhr et al.; Fox et al. (1994, 1995, 1998, 
2002); Hoffman et al., Huffman et al., Lusk et al.; Roosen et al.; and Shogren et al. 
(1999).  
4.  As is standard experimental protocol, researchers try to avoid questions of self-
selection by not telling potential subjects what the experiment is about or what products 
will be sold.  People are asked to participate in a “consumer food experiment” in return 
for a participation fee to cover their opportunity cost.   
5.  The question of what to do with negative values has also concerned researchers who 
use contingent valuation surveys to elicit values for environmental protection.   The 
concern is that some respondents who answer the survey valuation questions might have 
negative values for a change in environmental conditions but are prevented from 
expressing these concerns in their willingness to pay response (Bohara, Kerkvliet, and 
Berrens.). 
6.  Experimental evidence suggests the second price auction produces an efficient 
outcome in the aggregate; individual bidders, however, do not always bid sincerely (see 
Kagel; Knetsch, Tang, and Thaler).   
7.  By prescreening, people who would bid negative values for the pst growth hormone 
pork (sandwich) were actually given the pst pork sandwich as their endowed sandwich 
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and asked to bid on their willingness to pay to exchange that sandwich with a non-pst 
pork sandwich. 
8.  Other studies include Bohara, Kerkvliet, and Berrens, and Macmillan, Duff, and 
Elston.  Regardless of whether the focus is on allowing negative responses to willingness-
to-pay questions or substituting willingness-to-pay for willingness-to-accept questions, 
the core issue is that different people can have positive or negative values for the same 
private or public good. 
9.  Dickinson and Bailey design a valuation experiment that explicitly allowed for 
negative bids.  They examine consumer bidding behavior on meat characteristics, e.g., 
ability to trace retail meat back to the farm or animal; knowing the meat was produced 
without growth hormones or the animal was humanely treated, and extra meat safety 
assurances.   
10.  Also, in terms of the WTP-WTA gap in valuing safer food, for instance, a WTP 
elicitation frames the product as a “good”—people bid their WTP for more food safety 
(see Shogren et al., 1994).  In eliciting WTA values, the identical product is framed as a 
“bad”—people bid their WTA for less food safety.   
11. Experimental instructions are available on request from the authors. 
12. An open question is how to treat outlying responses in auction experiments.  Belsley, 
Kuh, and Welsch address this question by considering subsets of influential data.  One 
issue is lack of clarity on the separating line between data to be excluded and included.  A 
test to determine the cutoff point could be a joint test that embodies a trade-off between 
the degree of influence an additional data point has on parameters and the likelihood of 
removing a “valid” observation.  Otherwise, one has two options:  Eliminate no data or 
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the intuitive approach of eliminating outliers that are bad data “to the best of the user’s 
knowledge.”  We follow both approaches by considering all the data and by excluding 
responses with an absolute difference between bid and value exceeding $50.00.  
13.  Appendix A, available on request from the authors, shows the results when all 
outliers are included do not differ from the results obtained from the sample when 
outliers are omitted. The main differences is the variances of the estimated coefficients 
are larger relative to the coefficient value when all observations are considered, causing 
the estimated coefficients to have a larger confidence interval around zero and in turn a 
higher probability of being insignificant.  This observation is confirmed on the regression 
of H3 in which no estimated coefficients are statistically different from zero.      
14.  In Appendix B (available on request) we redo the statistics for the random nth-price 
auction to compare the results between the sample in which outlier observations are 
omitted and the sample in which no observations are omitted. The results obtained from 
the sample when outliers are included do not differ from the results obtained from the 
sample when outliers are omitted.  We again see the variances of the estimated 
coefficients are larger relative to the coefficient value, causing the estimated coefficients 
to have a larger confidence interval around zero and in turn a higher probability of being 
insignificant.  This observation is confirmed in each regression because no estimated 
coefficients are statistically different from zero.      
15.  Given the LM statistic and the Hausman test both suggest the random effects model 
is appropriate for our data, we focus on estimates from the more efficient error 
components model in all of the regression results reported. Results from two-way 
covariance models are qualitatively similar in each case. 
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16.  We test for structural differences between the estimates of the coefficients for the 
two samples, the second-price auction and the random nth-price auction.  The typical 
approach is to use a Chow test, which assumes the variances of the disturbance terms are 
the same across the entire sample (Greene).  But in examining the sum-squared errors for 
both regressions, the two sub-samples appear to have unequal disturbance term variances. 
We test the null hypothesis that the variances of the disturbance terms are identical using 
the Goldfeld-Quandt test.  We reject the null hypothesis at the 1 percent level (F(1157, 
1386) = 3.104; p-value < 0.0001).   Because the variance terms differ across samples the 
Chow test can overestimate the test statistic (Schmidt and Sickles).  A valid test for large 
samples is the Wald test for structural change which is unaffected by differences in sub-
sample disturbance term variances (Greene).  We cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the estimated coefficients are equal ( 36.0;02.224  valuep ).  Bidding behavior does not 
differ between the two auction types.   
17. Again we test for structural differences between the estimates of the coefficients for 
the two samples.  Again the two sub-samples have unequal disturbance term variances, so 
we test the null that the variances of the disturbance terms are the same using the 
Goldfeld-Quandt test.  We reject the null at the 1 percent level (F(1157, 1386) = 3.104; p-
value < 0.0001).   Using the Wald test for structural change, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the estimated coefficients are equal ( 57.0;92.224  valuep ). Again 
bidding behavior was similar in the two auctions.   
18. In Appendix C (available on request), we redo the statistics to compare the results for 
H2 and H3 when a treatment dummy and a treatment interactive variable are added to 
show the differences in slope and intercept coefficients for each treatment.  We compared 
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these results to those obtained in the text.  Looking at the induced values for each 
treatment, we observe in treatment A subjects possessed negative induced values in half 
the rounds, while in treatment B negative values occurred less than a third of the time.  
We cannot say that increased exposure to negative values increases the propensity for 
subjects to bid negative values more sincerely.  In contrast, it implies the opposite.  One 
explanation is the disengaged bidder.  As subjects face negative values more frequently, 
and if the market price is always positive, they now see they have little chance to win the 
good given a negative value and are therefore less likely to bid sincerely. 
19. Using the Goldfeld-Quandt test we reject the null that the variances of the disturbance 
terms are the same at the 1 percent level (F(774, 988) = 3.84; p-value < 0.0001).   Using 
the Wald test for structural change, we cannot reject the null the estimated coefficients 
are equal ( 46.0;64.324  valuep ).     
20.  In Appendix D (available on request), we redo the statistics to compare the results for 
H2 and H3 when a treatment dummy and a treatment interactive variable is added to 
show the different slope and intercept coefficients for each treatment.  Comparing these 
results to those in the text, we see the regression results for H2 with a treatment intercept 
variable and interactive slope term lead to the same conclusions.  Bidding did not differ 
across all-positive and positive-negative treatments even when we control for treatment 
effects.  For H3, individual treatment regressions gave conflicting results: in treatment D 
subjects bidding behavior did not differ between positive and negative values; in 
treatment E subjects behavior differed between positive and negative values.  A Wald test 
for structural change between two samples, however, indicated that bidding behavior did 
not differ between treatments D and E, and we can treat the two samples as one.  
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21.  While recognizing the caveats, the R2s are nearly twice as large for the second-price 
auction regressions relative to the random nth-price auction regressions suggesting that 
the model fits the data better.   
22.  We consider the sample with all observations.  Assuming two-way random effects 
we estimate equation (4).  Column two of table 5 shows the results.  The results from the 
entire sample differ substantially from the omitted observation sample.  Now the 
coefficient estimates on Nth*Low and Nth*Low*IN are significant.  All other coefficients 
are not statistically different than zero.  Based on these estimated coefficients, table 6 
presents the Wald test statistics for the joint hypothesis of zero intercept and slope equal 
to 1 for both on- and off-margin bidders in each auction for the entire sample.  We cannot 
reject the joint hypothesis for on-margin and off-margin high and off-margin mid bidders 
in both auctions.  For off-margin low bidders we cannot reject the null hypothesis in the 
second-price auction.   We reject the joint hypothesis for off-margin low bidders in the 
random nth-price auction at the 1 percent significance level.   Observed behavior in the 
random nth-price auction for low values deviated from theoretical predictions.   
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Table 1.  Summary Statistics on Bidding Behavior by Induced Value & 
Treatment—Excluding Outliers in which |Value-Bid| ≥ 50 
 
Sample Properties 
Induced 
Value 
Treatment A 
5 Neg – 5 Pos 
Treatment B 
3 Neg – 7 Pos 
Treatment C 
All Positive 
 X  Med 2  X  Med 2  X  Med 2  
8.9       9.08 8.87 3.68 
7.9       7.30 7.90 13.29 
7.6       7.68 7.60 21.50 
6.3       5.71 6.30 34.83 
5.2       5.96 5.20 10.66 
4.4    5.04 4.40 9.92    
4.0       4.27 3.99 14.24 
3.9 4.35 3.90 9.57       
3.5       3.38 3.50 9.75 
3.2    2.95 3.20 28.28    
3.1    3.62 3.10 20.56    
2.9 3.06 2.90 2.68 2.89 2.9 21.05    
2.6 2.37 2.60 1.48       
2.2       2.10 2.20 9.48 
1.4    1.40 1.40 46.33    
1.3 1.27 1.30 2.74 1.48 1.30 11.51    
1.1       0.57 1.10 18.58 
0.8    0.61 0.80 11.99    
0.3       0.06 0.29 21.71 
0.2 0.21 0.19 4.40       
-1.0 -1.25 -1.00 4.99       
-1.3    -1.80 -1.3 12.68    
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-1.5 -0.87 -1.50 3.92       
-2.8 -2.18 -2.80 3.57       
-3.9 -3.07 -3.9 8.83       
-4.4    -4.02 -4.40 43.41    
-4.7 -3.76 -4.7 11.93       
-4.8    -5.13 -4.80 34.49    
   
N = 60 
   
N = 40 
   
N = 40 
 
Note: each subject faced each value twice.  
Bids that were either greater than the induced value by $50, or less than the induced value by -$50 were 
excluded. 
N is the number of observations per induced value. 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics on Bidding Behavior by Induced Value & 
Treatment—Random nth -Price auction, Excluding Outliers in which |Value-Bid| ≥ 
50. 
 
Sample Properties 
Induced 
Value 
Treatment D 
5 Neg – 5 Pos 
Treatment E 
3 Neg – 7 Pos 
Treatment F 
All Positive 
 X  Med 2  X  Med 2  X  Med 2  
8.9       9.17 8.89  8.87  
7.9       8.51 7.89 69.21 
7.6       7.63 7.55 31.78 
6.3       5.81 6.29 16.16 
5.2       4.99 5.19 33.35 
4.4    7.72 4.39 148.49    
4.0       3.96 4.00 1.48 
3.9 2.15 3.75 70.30       
3.5       2.33 3.49 26.01  
3.2    2.77 3.19 10.05    
3.1    3.12 3.09 13.26    
2.9 3.29 2.90 39.64 2.95 2.89 3.71    
2.6 3.10 2.53 68.41       
2.2       2.42 2.19 13.42  
1.4    1.91 1.39 13.50    
1.3 1.05 1.20 8.49 1.56 1.30 4.96    
1.1       1.72 1.00 22.83 
0.8    0.86 0.79 31.78    
0.3       0.47 0.29 4.14 
0.2 1.39 0.20 37.10       
-1.0 -2.18 -1.00 40.41       
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-1.3    -2.37 -1.31 28.37    
-1.5 -1.93 -1.00 104.84       
-2.8 -4.38 -2.80 90.70       
-3.9 -1.99 -3.9 36.69       
-4.4    -5.51 -4.41 75.61    
-4.7 -6.76 -4.70 156.52       
-4.8    -2.96 -4.81 36.95    
   
N = 40 
   
N = 40 
   
N = 40 
 
Note: each subject faced each value twice.  
Bids that were either greater than the induced value by $50, or less than the induced value by -$50 were 
excluded. 
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Table 3.  Omitted Observations When |Value-Bid| ≥ 50. 
 
Treatment 
 
Round 
 
Player 
 
Value 
 
Bid 
 
Treatment 
 
Round 
 
Player 
 
Value 
 
Bid 
B 8 41 -4.40 -1000.00 D 10 86 0.20 -1000.00 
B 8 43 4.40 -50.00 D 7 86 2.90 100.00 
B 12 43 2.90 -50.00 D 20 88 -3.90 -150.00 
B 13 43 1.40 -500.00 D 20 101 1.30 -100.00 
B 14 43 -1.30 -200.00 E 3 101 -4.80 -75.00 
B 10 43 -4.40 -200.00 E 1 101 -4.40 -200.00 
B 9 43 0.80 -100.00 E 2 108 -4.80 50.00 
B 3 48 -1.30 100.00 F 9 115 0.30 -100.00 
C 4 59 7.60 -150.00 F 8 115 4.00 -75.00 
C 8 62 2.20 -150.00 F 11 115 7.60 -1000.00 
D 17 71 -4.70 -100.00 F 3 125 0.30 -100.00 
D 20 71 -2.80 -10000.00 F 9 125 0.30 -50.00 
D 9 71 1.30 -50.00 F 12 125 1.10 -74.00 
D 16 71 2.60 -100.00 F 6 125 2.20 -1000000.00 
D 6 72 -1.00 105.00 F 5 125 3.50 -1000000.00 
D 3 73 -2.8 500.00 F 8 125 4.00 -94.00 
D 4 73 3.90 400.00 F 4 125 6.30 -100000.00 
D 1 73 -1.00 200.00 F 2 125 6.30 -1000.00 
D 2 73 -1.00 150.00 F 11 125 7.60 -94.00 
D 3 74 1.30 200.00 F 10 125 7.90 -94.00 
D 6 80 -1.50 -721.00 F 7 125 8.90 -1000000.00 
D 12 80 -1.00 -720.00 F 1 125 8.90 1000.00 
D 3 80 0.20 217.62 F 3 128 1.1 -50.00 
D 11 80 -2.80 -167.50 F 4 128 7.60 100.00 
D 2 80 2.60 150.00      
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Table 4.  On Margin/Off Margin Deviations  (Bid – Induced Value) 
 
 
 
 
Second-Price 
Auction 
Random 
nth-Price 
Auction 
 
Aggregate 
On-margin     
 0.18 (3.41) 0.30 (7.16) 0.23 (5.43) 
 1.50 (3.09) 3.02 (6.50) 2.19 (4.97) 
 N = 338 
 
N = 276 
 
N = 614 
Off-margin high    
 - 0.01 (3.61) 0.36 (4.36) 0.16 (3.96) 
 1.51 (3.28) 1.98 (3.90) 1.72 (3.57) 
 N = 238 
 
N = 195 
 
N = 433 
Off-margin mid    
 0.03 (2.56) - 0.89 (7.56) - 0.36 (5.29) 
 1.39 (2.15) 4.31 (6.63) 2.37 (4.74) 
 N = 158 
 
N = 115 
 
N = 273 
Off-margin low    
 0.56 (4.15) - 0.20 (8.98)    0.24 (6.66) 
 2.27 (3.52) 3.72 (7.88) 3.14 (5.88) 
 N = 258 
 
N = 192 
 
N = 450 
Aggregate    
 0.21 (3.56) 0.02 (7.16) 0.12 (5.44) 
 1.69 (3.14) 3.18 (6.42) 2.34 (4.91) 
  
N = 992 
 
N = 778 
 
N = 1770 
On-margin is the set of Values [$2.50 to $5.00]. 
Off-margin high is the set of Values [$0.00 to $2.50]. 
Off-margin mid is the set of Values [$-2.50 to $0.00]. 
Off-margin low is the set of Values [$-5.00 to $-2.50]. 
Each cell gives mean deviations on the top line with S.D. in parenthesis, and then the  
mean absolute deviations on the bottom line with S.D. in parenthesis. 
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Table 5.  GLS (Random Effects) Estimation Results—On Margin, Off Margin Bidders  
 
Variable 
 
Omitted Observation Sample 
 
Entire sample 
CONSTANT - 1.19
(1.68) 
- 0.29 
(73.27) 
IN 1.42***
(0.51) 
1.04 
(22.13) 
High  1.14 
(1.85) 
1.31 
(81.00) 
Mid  - 0.80 
(3.03) 
- 1.71 
(133.27) 
Low  2.32 
(2.49) 
8.37 
(109.19) 
High*IN - 0.37
(0.89) 
- 3.73 
(39.11) 
Mid*IN - 2.02 
(2.04) 
- 1.16 
(89.67) 
Low*IN - 0.28
(0.68) 
2.95 
(29.61) 
Nth*On - 1.51
(2.51) 
- 6.39 
(109.22) 
Nth*High 1.14
(1.24) 
-19.33 
(53.67) 
Nth*Mid - 0.70
(4.11) 
16.05 
(176.02) 
Nth*Low - 3.38
(2.93) 
- 549.55*** 
(126.25) 
Nth*On*IN 0.50
(0.75) 
2.66 
(32.84) 
Nth*High *IN - 0.77
(1.14) 
18.66 
(49.39) 
Nth*Mid*IN 0.18
(3.19) 
19.34 
(137.26) 
Nth*Low*IN - 0.64 
(0.71) 
- 122.10*** 
(30.38) 
 
R2 
 
0.24 
 
0.02 
 
N 
 
1770 
 
1800 
Standard errors are in parentheses 
***significant at 1 percent level, **significant at 5 percent level, *significant at 10 percent level. 
a –outliers were observations in which |bid - value| > $50.    
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Table 6.  Tests of Joint Hypothesis of Zero Intercept, Unit Slope 
Omitted Observation Sample  
Random nth-Price Auction Second-Price Auction 
On-margin  
57.322  , p-value = 0.17 
 
04.122  , p-value = 0.59 
Off-margin High 
28.022  , p-value = 0.87 
 
01.022  , p-value = 1.00 
Off-margin Mid 
22.122  , p-value = 0.54 
 
66.022  , p-value = 0.72 
Off-margin Low 
94.122  , p-value = 0.38 
 
83.222  , p-value = 0.24 
  
Entire Sample  
On-margin  
04.022  , p-value = 0.98 
 
00.022  , p-value = 1.00 
Off-margin High 
13.022  , p-value = 0.94 
 
04.022  , p-value = 0.98 
Off-margin Mid 
02.022  , p-value = 0.99 
 
00.022  , p-value = 1.00 
Off-margin Low 
**2
2 83.17 , p-value = 0.0001 
 
10.022  , p-value = 0.95 
  
On-margin is the set of Values [$2.50 to $5.00]. 
Off-margin high is the set of Values [$0.00 to $2.50]. 
Off-margin mid is the set of Values [$-2.50 to $0.00]. 
Off-margin low is the set of Values [$-5.00 to $-2.50]. 
** significant at 0.01. 
 
